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CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES AND SALE AND REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS: 
REGULATING FINANCIAL MARKETS IN THE LIGHT OF  
YET ANOTHER “FALSE DAWN” 
Abstract  
In this article it is argued that the burgeoning faith of policy-makers and regulators in the ability 
of central counterparties (“CCPs”) to absorb both counterparty and collateral risk in “sale and 
repurchase agreements” (otherwise known as “repos”)—and, in turn, in helping to forestall 
contagion in the form of so-called “repo runs”—is misplaced. In developing this contention, 
three major claims are advanced. First, for all their benefits, CCPs exhibit a major design flaw 
in as much as they are unable to diversify away market-wide systemic risk when counterparty 
failures become correlated—as exemplified by the global financial crisis (“GFC”). Secondly, 
this design flaw is remarkably similar to the flaw which the modern trend towards market-based 
finance exhibits, again, as revealed during the GFC, and as persists in its more recent “fund-
based” guise, and that this parallel cautions against viewing CCPs in an unduly favourable 
light. That is to say, in much the same way that market-based finance helped to neutralize 
systemic risk in good or moderately turbulent times pre-crisis, but amplified it in times of acute 
market turbulence, so too CCPs are liable to exhibit similar tendencies. Finally, although the 
UK’s new regulatory and supervisory regime applicable to CCPs has much to commend it, these 
measures are, in fact, likely to be of limited assistance in ensuing that CCPs are able to perform 
their mutualisation role, or that they do not disrupt financial markets, when things go seriously 
wrong.  
 
Key words: central counterparties (CCPs); sale and repurchase agreements; repos; repo runs; systemic 
risk; market-based finance.  
 
1.    Introduction 
 
The global financial crisis (“GFC”) seemingly highlighted the critical need for well-
functioning financial market infrastructures (“FMIs”), such as central counterparties 
(“CCPs”)—or, as they are often referred to, “clearinghouses”.1 Acting as sophisticated risk 
                                                          
1 In legal terms, a “CCP” is in fact a special type of “clearinghouse”. According to Christian Chamorro-
Courtland, “[w]hereas a CCP operates as the ‘principal’ to every transaction entered into by the clearing 
members and clears through a mechanism called ‘multilateral novation netting’, an ordinary clearing house 
remains an ‘agent’ and does not perform counterparty substitution or assume liability for any of the transactions 
it clears. It clears through a mechanism known as ‘multilateral position netting’”: “Central Counterparties (CCP) 
and the New Transnational Lex Mercatoria” (2011) 10 Fla St U Bus Rev 57, at p.60 (footnotes omitted). 
According to Regulation (EU) 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC 
derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories—the so-called “European Market Infrastructure 
Regulation” (EMIR)—a CCP is defined as: “a legal person that interposes itself between the counterparties to 
the contracts traded on one or more financial markets, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every 
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management networks which straddle a number of jurisdictions and “clear”2 financial 
products that are traded globally, CCPs operate ex ante to improve counterparty and collateral 
risk controls, and ex post to ensure that, in the event of a member’s default, the associated 
losses are fully absorbed and the potential for contagious “runs” averted. Much has been 
made, for example, of the ability of CCPs to successfully contain Lehman Brothers’ default 
in 2008 (a bank with significant exposure to the over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivatives 
market) and prevent the spread of contagion amongst market participants.3 Moreover, the 
G20’s post-GFC support for the migration of standardized OTC derivatives to CCPs is 
emblematic of the increasing significance that these infrastructures have recently acquired.4 
Interestingly, and importantly, the idea that the use of CCPs should be extended to other 
types of financial transactions is beginning to gain increasing traction.5 One particular area 
where this is the case is in relation to Securities Financing Transactions (“SFTs”), the 
“flagship product”6 of which is “sale and repurchase agreements” (so-called “repos”).7 
Significantly, as part of its ongoing work on repos and securities lending, the Financial 
Stability Board (“FSB”) has recommended that authorities should “evaluate the costs and 
benefits of central clearing in their securities lending and repo markets”.8 And, more recently,  
                                                          
buyer.” (Art 2(1)). In the academic literature, however, the terms “clearinghouse” (or “clearing house”) and 
“CCP” are often used inter-changeably.  
2 “Clearing” is the “process of establishing positions, including the calculation of net obligations, and ensuring 
that financial instruments, cash, or both, are available to secure the exposures arising from those positions” 
EMIR, Art 2(2). 
3 Julia L Allen, “Derivatives Clearinghouses and Systemic Risk: A Bankruptcy and Dodd-Frank Analysis” 
(2012) 64 Stan L Rev 1079: “The experience of LCH.Clearnet, Ltd. (LCH) during the Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy proceedings provides a recent example of how a clearinghouse can successfully manage a member 
default and decrease systemic risk.” (at p.1081). It has been estimated that in managing Lehman’s default, the 
CCP which had the largest exposure—LCH—used only 35% of the bank’s $2bn of posted collateral. 
Consequently, there was no need to mutualize the losses amongst clearing members.  European Association of 
CCP Clearing Houses (“EACH”), An Effective Recovery and Resolution Regime for CCPs (December 2014), 
p.5. 
4 The G20 Leaders agreed at the 2009 Pittsburgh Summit that, where appropriate, all standardized derivatives 
contracts should be traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms and cleared through CCPs. It was also 
agreed that all standardized OTC derivatives contracts would be reported to trade repositories and that higher 
capital requirements would be introduced for non-centrally cleared derivatives contracts. 
5 Bank of England, The Bank of England’s supervision of financial market infrastructures—Annual Report 
March 2015 (http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/fmi/annualreport2015.pdf) “FMIs are 
assuming even greater systemic importance as the international regulatory community encourages more 
financial activity to take place via centralised infrastructures.” (at p.7). 
6 Euroclear, Understanding Repo and the Repo Markets (March 2009) at p.4. 
7 Liz Capo McCormick , “Financial Firms Move Closer to Central Clearing in Repo Market” (Bloomberg, April 
13, 2015) (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-13/financial-firms-move-closer-to-central-
clearing-in-repo-market); and Joe Rennison, “Bond Market Seeks Repo Clearing Solution” (The Financial 
Times, 24th November, 2015) (https://next.ft.com/content/3ff3dcce-928e-11e5-bd82-c1fb87bef7af). 
8 Financial Stability Board (FSB), Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking: An Integrated 
Overview of Policy Recommendations (Consultative Document 2012) (“Recommendation 12”) 
(http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_121118.pdf?page_moved=1) (at p.13). 
3 | P a g e  
 
Powell, a Member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, has offered his 
support to the migration of certain repo transactions to CCPs, arguing that the “central 
clearing [of highly liquid repo collateral] can produce significant benefits.”9 
In the US case of Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Management Corp. v. Spencer 
S&L Ass’n (In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Management Corp.), the Third Circuit 
defined a repo in the following terms:10 
A standard [sale and] repurchase agreement, commonly called a “repo,” consists of a two-part 
transaction. The first part is the transfer of specified securities by one party, the dealer, to another party, 
the purchaser, in exchange for cash. The second part consists of a contemporaneous agreement by the 
dealer to repurchase the securities at the original price, plus an agreed upon additional amount on a 
specified future date. A “reverse repo” is the identical transaction viewed from the perspective of the 
dealer who purchases securities with an agreement to resell. 
In essence, then, a repo is a type of short-term financing that is economically similar to a 
secured loan.11 Unlike a secured loan, however, a repo involves the legal transfer of an asset, 
and thus affords the lender better protection by virtue of immediate access to the collateral in 
the event of the other party’s default. A repo is also more flexible than a secured loan, in that 
it allows for “margining” to ensure that the amount of collateral is adjusted to reflect the 
value of the loan. Furthermore, since the loan that forms the basis of the repo is effectively 
securitized, and thus can be sold on, repos offer a high degree of liquidity. Although the size 
of the repo market has contracted significantly from its pre-crisis peak of 2008,12 more 
recently it has been estimated to be in the region of €15-20 trillion globally.13 In terms of 
their economic significance, repo markets are widely regarded as providing an efficient and 
diversified source of wholesale funding for financial intermediaries.14 This is said to help to 
inject greater liquidity into the financial system and, in turn, to help lower the cost of 
                                                          
9 Jerome H Powell, “Central Clearing in an Interdependent World” (Member Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System at The Clearing House Annual Conference New York, NY November 17, 2015) at p.13. 
10 878 F2d 742, 743 (3d Cir. 1989). 
11 Mike Williams, Repo: Its Role in Government Securities Markets—Policy and Operational Issues Arising 
(World Bank Group, April 2015), 
(http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/pubdocs/publicdoc/2015/10/999111444834071349/FS-Gemloc-PGD1-
20150428-Repo-Presentation-Mike-Williams.pdf). 
12 Bloomberg, The Repo Market (http://www.bloombergview.com/quicktake/the-repo-market). 
13 Richard Comotto, A Supplementary Note on the Systemic Importance of Collateral and the Role of the Repo 
Market (International Capital Market Association’s (“ICMA”) European Repo Council, 7 May, 2013) at para 
4.8. 
14 ICMA, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) “Question 3. Why is the repo market so important and why has 
the use of repo grown so rapidly?” (http://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/short-
term-markets/Repo-Markets/frequently-asked-questions-on-repo/3-why-is-the-repo-market-so-important-and-
why-has-the-use-of-repo-grown-so-rapidly/). 
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financial services activity more generally.15 In doing so, repo markets are thought to provide 
the type of financial hinterland that retail banks and other lenders require to service the 
financing needs of the real economy.16 What is more, repo markets play an important role in 
providing a liquid market for government securities, thus facilitating governments in their 
efforts to raise the finance necessary to make good on their public spending commitments.17  
 Yet, notwithstanding the widely acknowledged benefits of repo markets, this article is 
concerned with the important question of whether CCPs can resolve a key vulnerability 
associated with repo trading which, under certain conditions, could have far-reaching adverse 
consequences for the stability of financial markets more broadly. This vulnerability revolves 
around the fact that short-term collateralized loans such as repos are liable to become highly 
unstable during times of market stress.18 As a result, any threat to the collateral “backing” the 
expansion in credit volume created by the repo, or, indeed, to the solvency of either 
counterparty, can help to generate—and, through interconnecting chains of complex and 
potentially opaque transactions, augment and subsequently transmit—systemic risk by way of 
so-called “repo runs”.19 Tellingly, a number of studies now support the contention that a 
“repo run” was an important component of the GFC,20 and, accordingly, the threat of such 
runs are today regarded as an important cause for regulatory concern.21  
Set against this background, the article provides, a critical—and ultimately 
sceptical—assessment of the role and effectiveness of CCPs in addressing both counterparty 
and collateral risk in the context of repo transactions so as to forestall repo runs and avert 
systemic risk. In developing this line of argument, three major claims are advanced. First, that 
                                                          
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 See, Antoine Martin, David Skeie, and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, “Repo Runs” (2014) 27(4) The Review of 
Financial Studies 957 – 989; Garry B Gorton and Andrew Metrick, “Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo” 
(2012) 104 Journal of Financial Economics 425-451; and Adam Copeland, Antoine Martin, and Michael 
Walker, “The Tri-party Repo Market Before the 2010 Reforms” (2010) Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
(Staff Report No 477). 
19 See, European Securities and Markets Authority (“ESMA”), Trends, Risk and Vulnerabilities (No 1, 2013) at 
p.35. The concept of a “repo run” is widely associated with Gorton and Metrick’s seminal work on shadow 
banking see, eg Gary B Gorton and Andrew Metrick, “Regulating the Shadow Banking System” (2010) 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 261 (referring to “run on repo”). 
20 See, for example, Gorton and Metrick, supra n 17; and Copeland et al, supra n 17. However, see, Benjamin 
Munyan, “Regulatory Arbitrage in Repo Markets” (Office of Financial Research Working Paper, 29 October, 
2015) (arguing that runs were perhaps only the symptom of more general de-leveraging rather than a run on 
repo and that more evidence is needed) (at p.45). 
21 See for example, FSB, Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking Policy Framework for 
Addressing Shadow Banking Risks in Securities Lending and Repos (29 August 2013); and ESMA, supra n 19, 
pp.35-38.  
5 | P a g e  
 
for all their benefits, CCPs exhibit a major design flaw in as much as they are unable to 
diversify away market-wide systemic risk when counterparty failures become correlated—as 
exemplified by the GFC. Secondly, that this design flaw is remarkably similar to the flaw 
which the modern trend towards market-based finance exhibits, again, as revealed during the 
GFC, and as persists in its more recent “fund-based” guise, and that this parallel cautions 
against viewing CCPs in an unduly favourable light. That is to say, in much the same way 
that market-based finance helped to neutralize systemic risk in good or moderately turbulent 
times pre-crisis, but amplified it in times of acute market turbulence, so too CCPs are liable to 
exhibit similar tendencies. Finally, although the UK’s new regulatory and supervisory regime 
as applicable to CCPs has much to commend it, these measures are, in fact, likely to be of 
limited assistance in helping to address the problems identified above, or in ensuring that 
CCPs do not disrupt financial markets, when things go seriously wrong. Moreover, 
notwithstanding the introduction of new so-called “recovery” and “resolution” tools, there is 
a very real danger that, in providing CCPs with a more high-profile quasi-regulatory role, 
they will themselves morph into “too-big-to-fail” entities, and thereby augment moral hazard 
problems.  
Concerns about the role of CCPs in forestalling contagious runs have gained greater 
market and regulatory piquancy since the introduction of the so-called “European Market 
Infrastructure Regulation” (“EMIR”),22 which gives legal effect within the EU to the G20’s 
2009 support for the mandatory migration of standardized OTC derivatives to CCPs.23 
Although EMIR applies only to derivatives trading, it underscores the growing importance of 
CCPs, and indeed of FMIs more generally, and provides a highly sophisticated regulatory 
framework which would, most likely, be adapted to regulate the mandatory clearing of a 
broader range of financial transactions, including repos. The specific jurisdictional focus of 
the article is on the regulatory and supervisory arrangements which apply in the UK, albeit 
that these are filtered through both EU rules and global initiatives.  
 In exploring and developing the above ideas, the material is structured as follows. 
Section 2 addresses the issue of the role and significance of CCPs in modern day financial 
markets, with a particular focus on repo transactions. Section 3 looks at problems associated 
with the potential migration of repo transactions to CCPs, in particular, their inability to 
                                                          
22 Regulation (EU) 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, 
central counterparties and trade repositories (OJ No L 201, 27.7.2012, p.1). 
23 In the US, the primary legislation governing the regulation of OTC derivatives markets can be found in the 
Dodd-Frank Act (Title VII). 
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diversify away market-wide systemic risk when counterparty failures become correlated. In 
this context, the section also seeks to demonstrate the existence of worrying parallels between 
the clearing of “repos” via CCPs on the one hand, and the modern trend towards market-
based finance on the other, which caution against viewing CCPs in an unduly favourable 
light. Section 4 provides a somewhat jaundiced assessment of the ability of new regulatory 
and supervisory measures as applicable to CCPs to ensure that, as private entities, they act in 
ways which foster the public good, and that their operations do not disrupt financial markets 
when things go seriously wrong. Finally, section 5 draws together the various strands of the 
discussion. 
 
2.   The role and significance of CCPs  
 
Absent the services of a CCP, contracting parties to a repo—or indeed any financial 
contract—would need to assess the risk of the other party’s default (ie counterparty risk). 
Specifically, in a repo, the collateral-taker/cash-lender would need to: (i) ensure that the 
collateral posted (ie the “initial margin”) was sufficient to reflect the risk that, at some future 
date, it might need to be liquidated to cover the value of the loan; and (ii) undertake proper 
“margin maintenance” (via “variation margin”) during the life of the repo to ensure that the 
fluctuating value of collateral posted continued to match the value of the loan. In markets 
characterised by perfect competition, the interplay of market forces might be thought to 
eliminate—or at least reduce—the type of suboptimal risk assessments that could cause one 
counterparty to default and set in motion a series of contagious runs which adversely affect 
the entire financial services network. 
However, notwithstanding recent attempts to improve transparency within repo 
markets,24 optimal counterparty risk and collateral risk assessments are likely to be impaired 
by the prevalence of acute market failures which give rise to underappreciated risks. Most 
fundamentally, counterparties have an incentive to shirk their responsibilities and “free ride” 
on the due diligence and risk monitoring efforts of others. Thus, for example, where a cash-
                                                          
24 See, for example, the EU’s recent Securities Financing Transactions Regulation (“SFTR”), most of which 
came into effect on 12 January 2016: Regulation (EU) 2015/2365 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 25 November 2015 on transparency of securities financing transactions and of reuse and amending 
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. 
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lender’s exposure to its counterparty is relatively small, the lender will prefer that the full cost 
of any due diligence and risk assessment of a cash-borrower’s risk profile be borne by other 
lenders rather than themselves. The end result is a general tendency for firms to economise 
on counterparty risk assessment and an overall erosion of the disciplinary effects of private 
monitoring notwithstanding improvements in market transparency. This collective 
underinsurance in relation to risk assessment and underinvestment in the infrastructure and 
policies that would otherwise help to promote financial stability mean that it is likely that 
some repo risks will continue to be mispriced. In turn, this mispricing has potentially serious 
implications for the stability of financial markets where firms exhibit herd-like instincts and 
simultaneously seek (or need) to liquidate similar forms of collateral in times of market 
turbulence. Accordingly, the continuing presence of serious informational problems, and 
other market failures of the type mentioned above, make it unlikely that the operation of 
private counterparty constraints in the form of, for example, counterparty risk controls will 
ensure that private interests do not conflict with the public good.  
Against this backdrop, it has been suggested that CCPs can provide a workable 
solution to the problems highlighted above. CCPs seek to contain and disperse the risks 
associated with counterparty defaults, by acting as a “firewall” between the defaulting firm 
and any contagion-like loss flowing from the default which might otherwise threaten the 
financial system. The CCP does this by guaranteeing to honour the obligations of each 
counterparty to the contract, thereby removing any risk of counterparty default and any 
adverse ramifications associated with such an event. In the context of a repo trade, the CCP 
achieves this through a process of novation. This entails the CCP interposing itself between 
the repo buyer and repo seller, both of which are CCP members, so that the buyer and seller’s 
original contract is extinguished and replaced by two new contracts: one between the buyer 
and the CCP; and the other between the seller and the CCP. Scaled across the entire CCP 
network, the CCP becomes the proverbial “buyer to every seller and the seller to every 
buyer”. In the unlikely event that a counterparty does become insolvent, the CCP—supported 
by a series of risk management arrangements that it has put in place and a pool of financial 
resources that it may call upon (including, as is discussed below, its own funds if 
necessary)—seeks to ensure that the defaulting party’s obligations are fulfilled and that 
potential contagion is averted. Thus, to the extent that a CCP can be characterized as a proxy 
or surrogate regulator, the mandatory clearing of certain types of repo trades would involve 
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the displacement of private, bilateral counterparty risk assessments, on the one hand, by 
quasi-regulatory—and hence, quasi-public—assessments, on the other.  
In performing this role, a CCP offers both ex ante and ex post solutions to the problem 
of counterparty default and collateral risk. From an ex ante perspective, CCPs seek to engage 
in more rigorous counterparty risk assessments and undertake better margin maintenance than 
the parties themselves, thus minimizing the chances of default. In comparison with individual 
firms, CCPs are thought to be more likely to undertake timely and judicious risk assessments 
of counterparties. Not only are they said to be better resourced and, by virtue of the 
specialized role they perform, reckoned to be better placed than individual firms to undertake 
risk assessments, but, as discussed below, they also have greater incentives to do so owing to 
the fact that some of their own capital is potentially at risk if a member firm defaults and the 
firm’s collateral is insufficient to cover attendant losses. Centralized trading is also thought to 
give CCPs an unrivalled vantage point from which to survey the entire market and to take 
decisions which minimise both counterparty and collateral risk. Accordingly, in contrast to 
decentralized, bilateral repo trading where only one party is over-collateralized, a CCP takes 
“initial margin” from both counterparties at the outset, and by monitoring and adjusting the 
amount of “variation margin” needed on a daily basis to cover changes in the value of the 
collateral initially posted and the market value of a member firm’s positions, a CCP performs 
an important role ex ante in helping to prevent defaults from occurring.25 
From an ex post perspective, CCPs have a wide range of resources available to them 
in the event of a member firm’s default, and are buttressed by a supporting membership 
network, which combines to “insure, mutualize, and thereby dissipate the risk” that a single 
firm’s failure will adversely affect the viability of other interconnected financial firms.26 In 
other words, by sharing, or spreading, risk within the CCP membership network, CCPs help 
to forestall wider systemic collapse. Consequently, a repo cash-lender that might otherwise be 
fearful that a defaulting counterparty could cause it to falter, can rest assured that the CCP 
will honour the agreement (or will have in place measures to ensure that the agreement is 
fulfilled).27 In absorbing counterparty defaults in this way, CCPs help to prevent transmission 
                                                          
25 See, Bob Hills, David Rule, Sarah Parkinson, and Chris Young, “Central counterparty clearing houses and 
financial stability” (1999) June Bank of England Financial Stability Review, at p.122. 
26 Mark J Roe, “Clearinghouse Overconfidence” (2013) 101 California Law Review, 1641, at p.1647. See also 
Amandeep Rehlon and Dan Nixon, “Central Counterparties: what are they, why do they matter and how does 
the Bank supervise them?” (2013, Q2) Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 1, at pp.1-2. 
27 Roe, ibid., at p.1678.    
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of the adverse effects of a member’s default to the wider financial system and, in turn, the 
economy. 
 CCPs have the capacity to absorb the risk of counterparty default because of the 
resources which they may call upon—collectively known as a “default waterfall”—to help 
fulfil the defaulting counterparty’s obligations. A typical example of a CCP’s default 
waterfall is provided in figure 1 below. In determining the structure of the waterfall, and in 
particular the order in which the resources are to be utilised in the event of default, the CCP 
must ensure that an appropriate balance is struck between the “defaulter pays”/ “non-
defaulter pays” (ie mutualisation) principle, and therefore seeks to ensure that participants in 
the CCP arrangement—including the CCP itself—have the appropriate incentives and 
disincentives to act in ways which “support orderly default management”.28 Thus, if the CCP 
is unable to “auction off” the defaulter’s positions among surviving members, it will usually 
have resort to the defaulting member’s initial/variation margin and, if necessary, the 
defaulting party’s contribution to the CCP’s default fund—into which all members must pay 
upon joining the scheme.29 If this is insufficient to cover the losses, the CCP will then 
contribute some of its own capital to help absorb losses. This so-called “skin in the game” 
requirement ensures that a CCP is incentivised to undertake efficient margin maintenance 
from the outset so as to avoid the need to put any of its own capital at risk. Indirectly, this 
also has the effect of limiting the degree to which losses are passed on to non-defaulting 
members.30 Accordingly, it is only if the CCP’s own contribution is insufficient that the 
losses are mutualized—ie shared—amongst all the other (non-defaulting) members. This 
happens in two ways: first, the CCP may use the non-defaulting CCPs members’ 
contributions to the default fund; and secondly, if “these loss-absorbing resources (which up 
to this point are all pre-funded) are exhausted, … [a CCP] may call on surviving members to 
contribute a further amount, usually up to a pre-determined limit.”31 In the event that all the 
abovementioned resources prove insufficient to cover the losses sustained by a CCP 
member’s default, the CCP’s remaining capital becomes the last line of defence against 
counterparty default. Should this also prove insufficient, the CCP would become insolvent.  
 
 
                                                          
28 EACH, supra n 3, at p.6. 
29 Ibid., at pp.7-11. 
30 Rehlon and Nixon, supra n 25, at p.5. 
31 Ibid. 
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Figure 1 - a typical default waterfall 
  
 A further benefit of using CCPs is the reduction in counterparty risk associated with 
the multilateral netting services they provide. These services simplify any outstanding 
exposures between participating market players by “offsetting an amount due from a member 
on one transaction against an amount owed to that member on another, to reach a single, 
smaller net exposure”.32 The operation and effect of netting in this context is explained by the 
Squam Lake Working Group:33 
 
“Suppose, to pick an ideal example, that Dealer A has an exposure … to Dealer B of $1 billion . . . . 
That is, if Dealer B fails, then A would lose $1 billion. Likewise, B has an exposure to Dealer C of $1 
                                                          
32 Ibid., p.4.  
33 Squam Lake Working Group on Financial Regulation, “Credit Default Swaps, Clearinghouses, and 
Exchanges” 3 (Council on Foreign Relations, Center for Geoeconomic Studies, Working Paper, 2009), 
(available at http://www.cfr.org/financial-crises/credit-default-swaps-clearinghouses-exchanges/p19756) cited in 
Roe, supra, n 26, at fn 68. 
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billion, and C has an exposure to A of $1 billion. Without a clearinghouse, default by A, B, or C leads 
to a loss of $1 billion [by one of the other two]. With clearing, however, the positive and negative 
exposures of each counterparty cancel, and each poses no risk to anyone, including the clearinghouse.”  
 
In the event that the exposures do not cancel one another out neatly, as in the above example, 
netting can nevertheless produce a single net exposure.34 The clearing of transactions and 
netting of exposures, especially in the context of a member firm’s default, to arrive—once all 
sums owed are offset—at a single sum, helps to reduce counterparty risk and alleviate 
liquidity pressures on participating members (and putatively the wider financial system) in 
times of acute market stress. As such, the netting services provided by CCPs contribute, at 
least in part, to preventing counterparty failures from spilling over to other interconnected 
too-big-to-fail institutions.  
 
3. Problems associated with the use of CCPs 
 
Yet, for all the claimed advantages associated with mandating the use of CCPs to clear repo 
and other trades, a number of leading commentators have expressed grave concerns about 
what has been, disparagingly, referred to as the “clearinghouse cure”.35  Roe, for example, 
has argued that the effectiveness of CCPs is overstated in relation to the core risk that they 
are said to mitigate, namely that they will prove effective in preventing the failure of one 
financial firm from spreading to other financial firms to fail.36 At the heart of Roe’s critique 
of CCPs is his inversion of their most significant claimed advantage: the mutualization 
principle. While Roe accepts that CCPs can in some instances help to neutralize risk, in his 
view, very often—and especially in times of crisis—CCPs do not in fact eliminate the 
targeted risk from the financial system.37 Instead, argues Roe, CCPs merely serve to transfer 
that risk to other institutions—typically via member firms’ financial contracts with firms 
outside of the clearing system—that may or may not be well placed to bear it.38 If these 
                                                          
34 However, since CCPs tend to specialise in particular financial instruments, this reduces the scope for netting 
across products, which is possible in the context of bilateral trades. 
35 Craig Pirrong, “The Clearinghouse Cure” [2008–2009] Winter Regulation 44. See also, Roe, supra n 26; and 
Allen, supra n 3. 
36 Roe, ibid., at p.1699 
37 Ibid., “Although [CCPs] are efficient financial platforms in ordinary times, they do little to reduce systemic 
risk in crisis times.” (at p.1641). 
38 Ibid., at p.1646 (“The clearinghouse … primarily transfers losses, without decreasing the system’s total 
riskiness, turning the key question into whether those who are made to bear the systemic risk can handle it better 
than those who transfer it.”); and Hills et al, supra n 25, at p.127. 
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institutions are themselves systemically important, or too-big-to-fail, it follows that CCP 
arrangements may in fact funnel contagion to these vulnerable, yet vital institutions.39 This is 
particularly problematic given that, as has been illustrated in the previous section, a 
defaulting CCP member’s collateral is posted and subsequently liquidated to protect other 
CCP members, and therefore it is unavailable to honour obligations owed outside the CCP 
network. Consequently, unless these non-member firms are able to adjust for their exposure 
to this risk, the riskit is merely directed elsewhere rather than eliminated.  
 In this context, Roe further claims that although CCPs may be able to absorb and 
diversify away so-called “idiosyncratic risk”, risk-spreading—ie diversification—cannot 
successfully combat market-wide systemic risk where counterparty failures arise 
simultaneously, as occurred during the financial crisis.40 To the extent that any system-wide 
shock adversely affects the value of widely held forms of collateral, thus provoking a wave of 
deleveraging by cash-starved firms, collateral sales by CCPs in response to member firm 
defaults are liable to exacerbate downward pressure on prices. In such circumstances, CCPs 
are also likely to find themselves between the proverbial “rock and a hard place”, conflicted 
between regulatory responsibilities to act in the public interest and their private commercial 
need to generate profit. It is, for example, entirely possible that the commercial success of a 
CCP will be linked to the short term interests of a small number of vital member firms, and 
there is no guarantee that, at critical times—and especially when firms are hard pressed to 
meet margin calls and rollover their debt obligations—that the interests of these firms will be 
fully or even adequately aligned with the public good. Here, CCPs are more likely to be part 
of the problem rather than the solution, deepening the adverse impact of fire sales and adding 
to any ensuing panic, as CCPs and their member firms scramble for liquidity. 
 These difficulties are also likely to be compounded to the extent that CCPs become 
victims of their own success. That is to say, as an ever-wider range of trades are rendered 
subject to mandatory clearing, not only will high-quality collateral become more thinly 
“stretched” (and thus potentially cause CCPs to accept lower-quality collateral to compensate 
for the dearth of better-quality assets), but there is more centralization of risk and greater 
potential for mass fire-selling in the event of a shock. Likewise, insofar as CCPs place greater 
collective reliance on a narrow range of risk-management methodologies, such as changes to 
                                                          
39 Roe, ibid., at p.1641. 
40 Ibid., at p.1677 (“Regulators have extolled mutualization’s potential for dissipating risk as a core benefit of 
the clearinghouse, but they have been focusing on clearinghouse’s potential to handle an isolated failure (or 
handful of failures), while not paying enough attention to the conceptual problem of correlated failures.”).  
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haircuts or collateral eligibility, this could have the effect of synchronising market responses 
to market events in ways which are self-reinforcing and that result in the transmission of 
shocks to the financial system. According to the International Capital Markets Association 
(“ICMA”), the imposition of aggressive haircuts by CCPs arguably adversely affected the 
capital raising capabilities of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain in 2011, and 
increased the cost of servicing their debts.41 Consequently, at the very stage when the putative 
protections associated with CCPs are deemed most vital, by seeking to protect themselves—
and thus their members—from losses, CCPs are in fact most likely to expose their “Achilles 
heel” by acting as conductors of risk. 
 What is more, as this article seeks to show, there are in fact dangerous parallels 
between the animating rationales for the clearing of more financial transactions, such as 
repos, via CCPs on the one hand, and the modern dominance of so-called “market-based 
finance” on the other, which renders increased faith in CCPs to mitigate systemic risk a cause 
for grave concern. While both CCPs (directly), and market-based finance (indirectly), seek to 
harness the claimed benefits of risk-spreading, by repackaging risk so as to spread it amongst 
participants within their respective interconnecting networks, they both exhibit a similar core 
flaw. That is to say, any shock which adversely affects the underlying collateral on which a 
CCP-conducted transaction is based, or which disrupts the underlying transactional chains 
which characterise market-based finance, can create and transmit systemic risk through their 
respective interlinked and highly interdependent networks. In the case of market-based 
finance, this flaw was acutely exposed in the so-called “originate-to-distribute” model that 
was a core feature of much financial market activity at the time of the GFC, and, it is argued, 
in spite of numerous post-crisis reforms, endures in the “newer”, so-called “fund-based” 
model which has emerged in more recent years.42 Therefore, given that CCPs and market-
based finance are linked closely to the same underlying premises regarding the mutualization 
of risk within their respective networks, the discussion of the flaws of market based finance 
that follows below—first in its older form and then in its more recent guise today—provides 
an important, not to mention, instructive insight into the risks associated with greater reliance 
upon CCPs to help avert repo runs in a time of crisis.  
 Before the GFC, the rise of market-based “originate-to-distribute” finance was a 
response to perceived weakness associated with the traditional “originate-to-hold” model of 
                                                          
41 ICMA, FAQs, supra n 14, “Question 27. What does a CCP do? What are the pros and cons?” 
42 See, infra, n ? and accompanying text. 
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banking, where banks held loans to maturity, and, as a result, credit risk was dangerously 
concentrated.43 By contrast, securitized “originate-to-distribute” banking involved the pooling 
of often highly illiquid assets, and the transformation of those assets into more marketable 
securities. In the case of “simple” securitizations, reasonably homogenous assets, generally 
with a lower risk profile, were pooled and then sold on.44 More complex securitizations (so-
called “second-tier” and “higher-tier” securitizations), by contrast, involve a pool of bank 
loans being sold by the bank (as the “originator”) to a bankruptcy remote, off-balance sheet 
special purpose vehicle (“SPV”).45 The SPV was usually a thinly capitalized single purpose 
company whose shares were held by someone other than the originator. Since the SPV was 
not a subsidiary of the bank, it did not appear as part of the bank’s consolidated accounts 
(hence its off-balance sheet status). Moreover, in view of the fact that the SPV was a separate 
legal entity, the originator was not legally responsible for its obligations (thus rendering it 
bankruptcy remote). A primary motivation behind the use of such structured investment 
vehicles by banks was to avoid regulatory requirements, such as “minimal capital 
requirements, liquidity requirements, [as well as] reporting requirements and governance 
requirements.”46 
 Having purchased the pool of bank loans/assets, the SPV was then entitled to the 
interest payments and the principal sum made by the original borrowers. Acting on behalf of 
the SPV and in return for a fee, the originating bank collected the stream of cash flows 
associated with the re-packaged assets. To pay the bank for the loan pool, the SPV parcelled 
together the newly acquired loans (which included securitized mortgages, credit card 
receivables, car loan receivables etc) into securities which were backed by the cash flows 
(interest and principal payments) from the underlying loans (hence the term asset-backed 
securities) and then sold on to investors. Additional finance was typically secured via short 
term loans, which made such vehicles highly vulnerable in the event that funders lost 
confidence. In an attempt to make the newly issued asset-backed securities more attractive to 
investors, various tranches were issued, each exhibiting different risk-return characteristics.47 
                                                          
43 House of Commons Treasury Committee, House of Commons, Financial Stability and Transparency: Sixth 
Report of Session 2007-08 (HC 371) (March 2008) at para 43 or para 45 (hereinafter HC, Financial Stability). 
See also, Gorton and Metrick, supra n 18, at pp.425-451. 
44 House of Commons Treasury Committee, House of Commons, Financial Stability and Transparency: Sixth 
Report of Session 2007-08 (HC 371) (March 2008) at para 45 (hereinafter HC, Financial Stability). 
45 Ibid. For problems associated with this form of securitization, see, John C Coffee, “Enhancing Investor 
Protection and the Regulation of Securities Markets’ Testimony Before the United States Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs” (March 10, 2009) 53. 
46 Coffee, ibid. 
47 HC, Financial Stability, supra n 42.43, at para 59. 
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In the event that losses occurred, these were, in effect, apportioned on a sliding scale 
according to investors’ appetite for risk. In its Sixth Report on Financial Stability and 
Transparency, the House of Commons Treasury Committee explained the process as 
follows:48 
 
 In a common three-tranche, the least risky, or ‘senior’, tranche has the first claim on payments from the 
pooled mortgages. The ‘senior’ tranche has the highest credit rating, often triple-A investment grade, 
but receives a lower rate of interest than the other tranches. After the senior claims are paid, the middle 
or mezzanine tranche receives its payments. Mezzanine represents greater risk and usually receives 
below-investment grade credit ratings and a higher rate of return. The lowest, or equity, tranche 
receives payments only if the senior and mezzanine tranches are paid in full. The equity/first-loss 
tranche absorbs initial losses. Equity tranches are therefore the most risky tranche and consequently 
often unrated, but as a consequence offer the highest rate of return. This process, whereby losses are 
applied to more ‘junior’ tranches before they are applied to more ‘senior’ tranches, is known as 
subordination and is one, albeit important, form of credit enhancement. 
 
In other words there existed a “credit cushion” whereby the pool of mortgages or other 
securitized assets were structured in such a way as to “absorb a certain amount of losses 
before [any were sustained] at the triple-A level.”49 
 As noted above, this securitized—or “originate-to-distribute”—model of credit 
intermediation was originally inspired by a desire to mitigate the concentration of risks on 
bank balance sheets associated with the traditional “originate-to-hold” model. It sought to do 
this by re-packaging and dispersing credit risk in the belief that greater diversity amongst 
investors within the wider financial network would reduce the likelihood of a common 
response to unexpected events—and that, as a result, financial stability would be promoted.50 
As the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), claimed as little as a year or so before the 
financial crisis broke: 
 
                                                          
48 Ibid., at para 60. 
49 I Bell, Managing Director and Head of European Structured Finance at Standard & Poor’s, quoted ibid. In 
addition to tranching (or subordination), this credit cushion was bolstered by way of a number of other ‘credit 
enhancements’. For example, the use of: third party guarantees; excess serving techniques (which ensured that 
pre-set amounts of interest were expressly set aside from the servicing of the collateral to ensure that any short 
falls in cash flow for the senior tranche were covered); and, residual trading techniques (the apportionment of 
additional cash flows beyond those used for excess servicing). See, ibid., at para 61. 
50 IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report (April, 2006) at p.51, cited in the Turner Review, A Regulatory 
Response to the Global Banking Crisis (Financial Services Authority (FSA), March 2009) (hereinafter Turner 
Review), at para 1.4(ii).   
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“[T]he dispersion of credit risk by banks to a broader and more diverse set of investors, rather than 
warehousing such risk on their balance sheets, has helped make the banking and overall financial 
system more resilient[. Dispersion of such risks helps to] mitigate and absorb shocks to the financial 
system[, resulting in] fewer bank failures and more consistent credit provision”. 
 
Yet, despite the ability of this market-based model to weather a number of market disruptions 
over the years, the events associated with the financial crisis exposed fundamental 
weaknesses in the model’s ability to mutualize risk within its wider network in the ways that 
were originally envisaged. These weaknesses not only revolved around the mispricing of risk 
due to perverse remuneration policies, poor due diligence and underwriting practices, 
inaccurate credit rating agency (“CRA”) risk assessments and so on, but were, in fact, more 
deep-seated.51 The securitization models which underpinned the use of this version of 
market-based finance failed adequately to take into account system-wide shocks which 
prompted correlated responses by market participants to act in a herd-like manner in search of 
liquidity and/or better quality collateral. Accordingly, at the very moment when the 
mutualization of risk which market-based finance promised was, in fact, most sorely needed, 
it revealed a series of self-reinforcing linkages and interconnections through which contagion 
quickly and dangerously spread. 
 Given the vulnerabilities associated with the form of securitization exposed by the 
GFC, and the post-crisis reforms imposing more stringent capital adequacy requirements and 
accounting standards in relation to banks’ exposure to off-balance sheet entities, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that “the pre-crisis institutional landscape of securitization intermediaries has 
almost entirely disappeared.”52 Instead, post-GFC most off-sheet balance entities such as 
SPVs have been reintegrated back onto banks’ balance sheets,53 and a newer, so-called “fund-
based” model, of market-based finance has emerged in which “cash portfolio and risk 
portfolio managers’ functions are intermediated through dealers.”54 In a recent article, 
published as part of the Financial Conduct Authority’s (“FCA”) influential Occasional Paper 
                                                          
51 Lord Turner has previously suggested that the securitized credit intermediation model may exhibit “inherent” 
problems: “irrational swings in prices of credit securities held by banks, and thus in their capital resources, are 
likely to be far more economically significant than irrational swings in the prices of equity investments held by 
end investors. It is therefore possible that the growth of the securitised credit intermediation model … increased 
systemic risk in ways which are not just the result of poor execution—bad remuneration policies, inadequate 
risk management or disclosure, failures in the credit rating process—but [which are] inherent.” Turner Review, 
ibid. 
52 Matteo Aquilina and Wladimir  Kraus (both of whom work in the Chief Economist Department of the FCA), 
Market-Based Finance: Its Contributions and Emerging Issues (FCA Occasional Paper, No 18, May 2016) at 
p.18.  
53 Ibid, p.18.  
54 Ibid, p.9.  
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series, Aquilina and Kraus (both of whom work in the Chief Economist Department of the 
FCA) set out what they acknowledge is a “highly stylized and simplified” model of the key 
elements of this newer conception of market-based finance: 55 
 
“The Capital Funding Bank (CFB) separates the risks (duration and credit) of some underlying asset 
such as residential mortgage backed security (RMBS) using derivatives, Interest Rate Swaps (IRS) and 
Credit Default Swaps (CDS) and manages their transfer. The risks are transferred (sold) to the Asset 
Manager (AM) who parks these risks as (contingent) liabilities in some fund on behalf of clients 
(investors) who become the ultimate and only bearers of the risk in the system. After the risk transfer, 
the CFB ends up holding CDS and IRS contracts as contingent assets, but also, and importantly, an 
essentially risk-free, short-term asset, akin to a short-term T-bill. The CFB then uses that leftover 
riskless piece as collateral to obtain funding from the AM. But just as this riskless piece is the AM's 
asset, it at the same time constitutes a funding liability of the CFB. Similarly, the derivatives are the 
AM’s contingent liabilities as they are contingent assets of the CFB.”  
 
Interposed between the CFB and the AM are two important intermediaries: the “derivatives 
dealer” which makes the markets in the risk transfer for the derivatives from the CFB to the 
AM by intermediating risk flow and establishing the price of risk; and the “global money 
dealer” which makes the markets in the collateralized funding obtained by the CFB from the 
AM.56 These dealers set market prices by providing their own balance sheets to absorb 
trading flows. Their function is, therefore, confined to market-making, in that they do not 
purchase securities on their own account. Instead, they are matched-book dealers.57 Thus, in 
contrast to traditional banking, which seeks to link ultimate borrowers and ultimate savers, 
the fund-based model of market-based finance entails financial institutions becoming so-
called “dealer banks that purchase bond portfolios”,58 resulting in a system which links “cash 
portfolio managers and risk portfolio managers who in turn manage ultimate savers’ 
savings.”59  
 Significantly, this fund-based model of market-based finance is regarded as an 
improvement on more traditional forms of such finance in that it harnesses the benefits of 
                                                          
55 Ibid, p.39-40. This section draws heavily on the Aquilina and Kraus paper, supra n 52, since the authors 
provide both the most recent and most comprehensive overview of the relevant literature, and, in doing so, offer 
a helpful distillation of post-GFC market based finance’s key characteristics.  
56 Ibid, p.13 
57 Ibid, p.40 
58 Ibid, p.12 
59 Zoltan Pozsar, “Shadow Banking and the Global Financial Eco-System” (2013) November 7 VoxEU 
(available online at http://www.voxeu.org/article/global-financial-ecosystem-0) [Accessed July 26, 2016], cited 
in Aquilina and Kraus, ibid.  
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risk-spreading and mutualization, while at the same time operating with much lower leverage 
and maturity transformation. As such, the business models of the entities involved entail less 
dependence on banks and insurance companies to provide liquidity and credit risk 
backstops.60 Nevertheless, this newer model also exhibits a number of critical weaknesses, 
many of which resonate with some of the earlier deficiencies associated with market-based 
“originate-to-distribute” securitizations. For example, in most cases, fund-based market-
based finance involves long, complex and, therefore, opaque intermediation chains, as risk 
becomes more and more diversified (and therefore concealed).61 Indeed, as the Aquilina and 
Kraus openly acknowledge, since the model they develop does not fully reflect the real-world 
complexities of modern-day financial markets,62 the exact form in which the ultimate 
investors (ie those investing in funds run by asset managers) hold their wealth, and 
consequently the exact institutional forms and levels of complexity evident in the processes 
of intermediation associated with the fund-based form of market-based finance will vary 
considerably.63  The lack of transparency created by these long and complex chains of 
intermediation are, however, capable of misleading not only intermediaries, but also investors 
and regulators, as to the exact size and location of risk, allowing it to accumulate “unnoticed 
and unchecked giving rise to the possibility that, when hidden risks suddenly become 
apparent, market participants panic.”64 This is particularly problematic, since the fund-based 
model of market-based finance is heavily dependent on intermediaries to make markets and 
determine prices in both assets and funds. Put differently, both derivatives traders and global 
money dealers play an “essential role in in ensuring the smoothness and efficiency of credit 
intermediation from the ultimate savers to the ultimate borrowers.”65 Thus, as the Aquilina 
and Kraus explain:66 
 
“The main risk to the stability and efficient working of a globally interconnected system is the failure 
of the dealer markets to provide efficient pricing of funding and asset risk exposure. Failure of the 
dealer markets to perform their market making functions is likely to lead to disruptions in market 
liquidity and risk transfer mechanisms well beyond local epicentres of initial stress.”  
                                                          
60 Aquilina and Kraus, ibid., at p.9 
61 Indeed, as the Aquilina and Kraus point out: “[f]or example, loans of lower quality may require a longer chain 
and more complex techniques to enhance the quality of the manufactured asset-backed securities to be able to 
offload them to money market mutual funds and other end investors, thereby masking, rather than truly 
diversifying, the underlying risks in the process.” Ibid., at p.24. 
62 Ibid., at p.39.  
63 Ibid., at p.13. 
64 Ibid., p.24.  
65 Ibid., p.13.  
66 Ibid., p.14. 
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 In particular, given that all, or many, positions within a fund-based model of market-
based finance are collateralized, a shock affecting the value of the underlying collateral can 
create and transmit systemic risk throughout the entire financial system. This is because 
“following a major asset price correction, increases in margin and haircuts [can] cause the 
wholesale funding for many firms to dry up, forcing them to sell assets to raise liquidity to 
meet their credit commitments.”67 Consequently, although fund-based market-based finance 
is quite different from the more traditional pre-crisis securitization approach, its Achilles heel 
is almost identical. In times of acute market stress entailing a shock to the value of collateral 
and an ensuing cascade of collateral calls, the system creates, transmits, and exacerbates 
systemic risk through interconnecting credit chains. In such circumstances, firms fire-sell 
assets as part of a “rush to the exits”, and thereby trigger downward liquidity spirals that are 
self-reinforcing.68 What is more, these risks are liable to spill-over into the traditional 
banking system to the extent that traditional banks are involved in, or are exposed to, market-
based finance, for example by providing underwriting or credit lines to market-based finance 
entities.69 In sum, then, much like its older relative, the new fund-based market-based finance 
is premised on essentially the same ideas, exhibits many of the same problems, and is liable, 
therefore, to give rise to equally toxic results.      
 In light of the above discussion, it is argued that a version of the core flaw evident in 
the pre-crisis form of market-based finance, and which is liable to persist in its more modern 
fund-based guise, is also dangerously present in the use of CCPs: namely, that while 
mutualisation, or risk-spreading, among member firms can contain and dissipate certain types 
of risk, it cannot deal well with market-wide systemic risk. That is to say, much like market –
based finance (old and new), CCPs are unlikely to prove effective bulwarks in the event of 
unexpected correlations fuelling fire sales, which, through interconnecting credit chains, 
exacerbate counterparty defaults. Thus, while both market-based finance networks and CCPs 
can at times make markets more robust, during moments of significant market turbulence 
they will, in fact, tend to drain liquidity away from the system when the need for such 
liquidity is most acute. Accordingly, notwithstanding that both market-based financing 
techniques and CCPs may prove resilient in good times—and may even protect against 
                                                          
67 Ibid., p.24. This is also discussed in more detail at pp.41-43. It should also be noted that an increase in risk 
may also result in intermediaries refusing to provide their services altogether (see, ibid., at p.31).   
68 Ibid., p.43. 
69 Ibid., p.24.  
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certain types of risk in bad times—they are nevertheless likely to exacerbate problems when 
things go seriously wrong. In this sense, there is a risk that the general effectiveness of 
CCPs—like the general effectiveness of market-based finance networks—will lull us into a 
false sense of security about what can realistically be achieved when their putative benefits 
are most acutely needed. 
 What is more, claims that CCPs fared well during the GFC, and that this offers some 
measure of reassurance with regard to their more widespread use, miss the point.70 CCPs 
performed their functions during the crisis in an environment where the authorities had 
already provided both explicit support for vital financial institutions and implicit support for 
the entire financial services network. How FMIs in general, and CCPs in particular, would 
have fared had such support not been forthcoming remains very much an open question.71 
  Finally, and perhaps most worryingly of all, in addition to concerns about the inability 
of CCPs to deliver in times of correlated crisis, there is a very “live” danger that they will 
also compound problems associated with so-called “too-big-to-fail” financial institutions, and 
thereby accentuate ongoing concerns about moral hazard. Contrary to statements by the 
authorities post-crisis to promote policies which seek to end “too-big-to-fail”—and thus 
reduce moral hazard72—the policy-choice of co-opting CCPs to act as “proxy” or “surrogate 
regulators” is liable to do the opposite. In view of the fact that, in advance of seeking to 
disperse risk, CCPs pull “previously decentralized, discrete, and systemically containable 
risks into a single platform”,73 CCPs can themselves become “too-big-to-fail” institutions—
thereby moving the problem of potential bailout from one systemically critical arena (a vital 
financial institution) to another (a pivotal CCP), and, in the process, augmenting problems 
associated with moral hazard. Admittedly, past CCP/clearinghouse failures are relatively few 
                                                          
70 See, Chamorro-Courtland, supra n 1, at fn 1; and Allen, supra n 3. 
71 See, Powell, supra n 9: “It is often noted that CCPs made it through the recent financial crisis without direct 
government assistance. But many of their major clearing members did receive such assistance. CCPs must now 
plan for a world in which these large firms will fail and be resolved without government support.” (at p.2). 
72 At an international level, at the Pittsburgh Summit in 2009, G-20 Leaders called on the FSB to propose 
measures to address the systemic and moral hazard risks associated with systemically important financial 
institutions (SIFIs). In this respect see, FSB, Progress and Next Steps Towards Ending “Too-Big-To-Fail” 
(TBTF): Report of the Financial Stability Board to the G-20 (2 September 2013) (http://www.fsb.org/wp-
content/uploads/r_130902.pdf?page_moved=1). For a UK perspective, see, for example, Sir Jon Cunliffe, 
“Ending Too Big to Fail – progress to date and remaining issues” (referring to the “agenda to end too big to 
fail”) (Speech given by Deputy Governor Financial Stability, Member of the Monetary Policy Committee, 
Member of the Financial Policy Committee and Member of the Prudential Regulatory Authority Board at The 
Barclays European Bank Capital Summit, London 13 May 2014) 
(http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2014/speech727.pdf). 
73 Roe, supra n 26, at p.1646. 
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and far between, but they are nevertheless far from unknown, they have been potentially 
serious, and, at the very least, they serve as a “cautionary tale”.74  
 Furthermore, as the next section seeks to highlight, notwithstanding the obvious 
sophistication of the UK’s regulatory and supervisory arrangements as they apply to CCPs,  
a number of fundamental problems nevertheless remain which are likely to render these 
“state-of-the-art” measures of limited assistance in helping CCPs mutualize losses in the 
ways envisaged by policy makers and regulators. As a result, any potential reforms geared 
towards mandating the use of CCPs to clear an increasing range of financial trades, including 
repos, which is reliant on these reforms remains highly problematic. In particular, although 
new recovery and resolution regimes have been embedded within the UK’s regime so as to 
allay fears about taxpayers having to shore up ailing CCPs, and to ensure that, in a worse-
case scenario, CCPs are “decommissioned” in such a way as to cause the least harm to the 
financial system, these novel facets of the UK’s regulatory and supervisory regime are, in 
fact, likely to be beset by the same types of problems which, it is suggested, undermine the 
effectiveness of CCPs more generally.   
 
4. How CCPs are regulated and supervised and why such measures are 
likely to be of limited assistance in times of crisis? 
 
In view of the fact that CCPs are private commercial entities with private commercial 
interests, there is a need to ensure that, as a result of co-opting them to perform quasi-
regulatory (ie public) functions, they operate in ways that are consistent with promoting the 
public good. Accordingly, in the UK, CCPs are subject to a regulatory and supervisory 
regime, the key features of which are set out and discussed below. This discussion is filtered 
through the relevant EU measures and international soft law initiatives which have influenced 
the UK system.  
In the UK, responsibility for the regulation and supervision of CCPs/clearinghouses 
rests with the Bank of England (the “Bank”), alongside its wider responsibilities for ensuring 
the safety of the financial system. The regulatory regime is set out in Part 18 of the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 (“FSMA”) (as amended), which applies to so-called 
recognised clearing houses (“RCHs”). In order to become a recognised clearing house, 
                                                          
74 See, Hills et al, supra n 25, at p.133.  
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applicants must apply for, and secure, a “recognition order” made by an “appropriate 
regulator”, which today is the Bank.75 Once recognition is secured, an RCH is exempt from 
the “general prohibition” in s 19 of the FSMA 2000, but only “as respects” any regulated 
activity which is carried on for the purposes of, or in connection with, its role as a RCH.76 
Accordingly, if an RCH acts outside the services and activities associated with its role, it is 
no longer covered by its exempt person status and is rendered subject to the strictures of the 
general prohibition.77 
 The regulatory regime has been rendered more complicated of late by the introduction 
of EMIR, which, inter alia, makes the clearing of standardized derivatives trades via CCPs 
mandatory within the EU (and thus gives legal effect to the G20 Leaders’ 2009 Pittsburgh 
Summit agreement). While both EMIR and its supporting technical standards are directly 
applicable in the UK (and thus take effect automatically without the need for domestic 
transposition), some amendments have nevertheless been made to Part 18 FSMA 2000 to 
facilitate its operation in this jurisdiction. Most significantly, a new category of RCH, known 
as a ‘recognised central counterparty’ has been created, encompassing those recognised CCPs 
that are authorised under EMIR and made subject to its provisions.78 The consequence of 
these developments is that in the UK different recognition requirements apply to those 
entities which seek to provide clearing services as a CCP and those which do not.79 
Accordingly, in order to secure and maintain authorisation under EMIR, a clearing house that 
is a CCP must not only comply with EMIR and its technical standards, but also with 
additional UK domestic requirements (such as rules in relation to the prevention of market 
abuse or financial crime).80  
Requests for authorisation under EMIR must be submitted to the relevant national 
competent authority (“NCA”)—which, in the UK, is the Bank. The Bank conducts a review 
of each UK CCP’s application against EMIR’s organisational, conduct of business, and 
prudential requirements, and against relevant domestic stipulations.81 Once the application is 
                                                          
75 FSMA 2000, ss 285(1)(b), 285A(2) and 288. 
76 FSMA 2000, s 285(3) and (3A).  
77 These include criminal, civil, and administrative sanctions.  
78 FSMA 2000, s 285(1)(b)(i) and s 285(3A).  
79 See FSMA 2000, s 288(1) concerning entities that intend to provide clearing services as a CCP, and s 288(1A) 
concerning those entities that intend to provide clearing services without doing so as a central counterparty. 
80 See the recognition requirements set out in Part 5 and 6 of the Schedules to the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 (Recognition Requirements for Investment Exchanges and Clearing Houses) Regulations 
2001/995 (as amended by Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Over the Counter Derivatives, Central 
Counterparties and Trade Repositories) Regulations 2013/504).   
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complete, the Bank makes a recommendation to the relevant supervisory college82 with 
regard to applicant’s authorisation.83 The supervisory college then has 30 days to offer an 
opinion on the Bank’s recommendation.84 A successful applicant is granted a “recognition 
order” under FSMA, which also constitutes authorisation under EMIR. The recognition order 
“specifies the services and activities the CCP can provide or perform”, as well as the 
categories of financial instruments covered by the authorisation.85 To date, three UK 
“recognised central counterparties” have been authorised under EMIR.86 
The Bank’s general supervisory approach to CCPs (and indeed in relation to those 
RCHs that are not “recognised central counterparties”) is shaped by international soft law 
norms, which have in turn also played a part in helping to influence EU measures. Pre-
eminent amongst these norms are the 24 Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures 
published by the Bank for International Settlements’ (“BIS”) Committee on Payments and 
Market Infrastructures and the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(“CPMI-IOSCO”) in April 2012.87 These principles form the self-declared “foundation 
stone” upon which the Bank’s supervisory approach to CCPs—and FMIs generally—is 
based, and provide the minimum standards against which the Bank assesses the UK’s entire 
regulatory and supervisory framework.88  
Furthermore, given the increasing risk that CCPs and other FMIs will themselves 
become too-big-to-fail entities—and given that they straddle different jurisdictions and clear 
products that are globally traded—work has also been undertaken at the international level to 
ensure consistency in relation to FMI recovery and resolution regimes.89 Although recovery 
and resolution tools are not necessarily mutually exclusive, “recovery” in this context refers 
to measures that an FMI might itself undertake to address events which threaten its viability 
as a going concern (such as levying additional contributions from members firms or 
temporarily or permanently closing a particular clearing service). “Resolution”, meanwhile, 
                                                          
82 A supervisory college is formed for each CCP and includes other relevant EU authorities under the 
chairmanship of the relevant NCA. 
83 EMIR, Arts 17(a) and 19(1). 
84 EMIR, Art 19(1). 
85 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Pages/fmis/applications/rch_app.aspx 
86 www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/ccps_authorised_under_emir.pdf (last updated 12 May 2016). 
87 www.bis.org/publ/cpss101a.pdf.  
88 The Bank of England’s approach to the supervision of financial market infrastructures (April 2013) 
(www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Documents/fmi/fmisupervision.pdf ) 
89CPMI-IOSCO, Recovery of financial market infrastructures (www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d121.pdf); FSB, Key 
attributes of effective resolution regimes for financial institutions (15 October 2014) (Appendix II, Annex I on 
FMI resolution) (www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_141015.pdf ). 
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refers to the process under which national authorities are afforded intervention rights to 
resolve a distressed FMI in a way that minimizes harm to the financial system (eg a wind 
down of the CCP and/or the transfer of viable parts of the business to another party). Not 
surprisingly, UK measures directed at CCP recovery and resolution are already well 
advanced. As a result of changes to the recognition requirements noted above, all UK 
“recognised central counterparties” have, since early 2014, been under an obligation to 
implement and keep under review their recovery plans.90 In addition, following the 
implementation of secondary legislation in July 2014, as of August 2014 provisions in the 
Financial Services Act 2012 now extend the UK’s Special Resolution Regime to cover UK 
“recognised central counterparties”.91 Accordingly, the Bank may use a number of tools to 
mitigate any adverse impact on the financial system resulting from the demise of a CCP.  
In assessing the above measures, it is clear that having been influenced by 
international soft law norms and framed, in part, by binding EU rules, the UK can today 
proudly boast a highly sophisticated and nuanced regime governing the operation of RCHs. 
Specifically, this regime provides UK “recognised central counterparties” with a framework 
within which they may carry out their risk mitigation functions, and provides the authorities 
with some assurance that these CCPs will not have carte blanche to act in ways that are 
inimical to the public good. However, in so far as CCPs retain a discretion to undertake 
private decisions notwithstanding the constraints to which they are subject, there is a genuine 
risk that they will pursue their own interests at the expense of the public good. This is likely 
to happen where the commercial success of a CCP—or, potentially, its survival—becomes 
reliant on the financial viability of a core number of member firms, the interests of which 
may not necessarily be aligned with the public good. What is more, this disjuncture is likely 
to have the greatest impact when the need to protect the public interest is most acute. As 
Pirrong points out, “CCPs are effectively the agents of some participants of one part of the 
financial system, and have incentives to take actions that benefit these participants.”92 
Therefore, in so far as CCPs retain a discretion to act, notwithstanding the existence of  
sophisticated regulatory and supervisory framework, they are in fact incentivised to take 
                                                          
90 Regulation 3 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Over the Counter Derivatives, Central 
Counterparties and Trade Repositories) (No. 2) Regulations 2013 amending the Financial Services and Markets 
Act 2000 (Recognition Requirements for Investment Exchanges and Clearing Houses) Regulations 2001 
(www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/1908/made) 
91  
92 Craig Pirrong, “A Bill of Goods: CCPs and Systemic Risk” 
(http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/law-economics-studies/Pirrong_Paper.pdf) at p.4. 
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decisions which have the effect of “shift[ing] losses and risks away from their members to the 
broader financial system.”93 The upshot of such decision-making could lead to the shifting of 
losses to parts of the system that are too vulnerable to sustain them, thereby undermining the 
claim that CCPs can help to contain contagious repo runs. The argument here is not that CCP 
decision-making is undertaken with the aim of inflicting such harm, but that by looking to 
protect their own interests first—and consequently those of their members—inflicting harm 
on the wider network is liable to prove to be an incidental, yet unavoidable, feature of 
clearing trades through CCPs. 
Likewise, in relation to the use of recovery and resolution tools to assuage concerns 
about the creation of too-big-to-fail CCPs, while the introduction of such measures 
undoubtedly represent an improvement on more rudimentary legal solutions, it nevertheless 
remains highly debatable whether these domestic or regional (ie EU) tools will, in fact, prove 
effective in relation to complex cross-border arrangements which involve FMIs that operate 
on a global stage. In particular, such measures are wholly untested in the context of the types 
of multiple correlated failures that characterise today’s modern, global, highly 
interconnected, complex and often opaque markets.94 
   
5. Conclusion 
CCPs/Clearinghouses have been an important, if unglamorous, facet of financial markets for 
many years. Recent global developments mandating the clearing of standardized derivatives 
contracts via CCPs have, however, catapulted these FMIs to the forefront of regulatory 
reform. One area where increasing interest in the migration of trading to CCPs has begun to 
gain traction is in relation to Securities Financing Transactions (SFTs) in general, and repo 
agreements in particular. Admittedly, few policy-makers and regulators are naïve enough to 
think that CCPs represent a panacea to the problem of resolving counterparty and collateral 
risk—and, thereby, forestalling the potential for repo runs. Nevertheless, many now view 
                                                          
93 Ibid., at p.41. 
94 Tellingly, in the EU banking context, it has been reported that Italy has sought to sidestep similar measures 
designed to avoid the need for costly taxpayer bailouts: Alex Barker and Rachel Sanderson, “Renzi seeks help 
for Italy’s banks after Brexit wobble” Financial Times, June 27, 2016 (https://www.ft.com/content/b5a0579a-
3c48-11e6-8716-a4a71e8140b0). 
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them as representing a significant step forward in making financial markets better at 
calibrating and managing risk, and thus rendering repo (and other) markets more resilient.  
This article has sought to assess the extent to which CCPs are capable of addressing 
counterparty and collateral risk—and, in turn, helping to forestall the potential for repo runs. 
It is argued that for all their benefits, CCPs exhibit a major design flaw in as much as they are 
unable to diversify away market-wide systemic risk when counterparty failures become 
correlated. What is more, it is argued that this flaw is remarkably similar to the flaw besetting 
market-based finance more generally, both as revealed during the financial crisis and as is 
liable to endure in its more modern, fund-based, guise. Thus, while both market-based 
finance networks and CCPs can often make markets more robust, during moments of 
significant market turbulence they tend to drain liquidity away from the system when it is in 
fact most needed. Accordingly, at the very time the protections that CCPs are said to offer are 
most acutely needed, CCPs are in fact liable to expose their Achilles heel and to act as 
conductors of risk.  
Consistent with their increasing importance as central players in the newly emergent 
international financial architecture, FMIs in general and CCPs/clearinghouses in particular, 
have also been the focus of renewed efforts to ensure that they are rendered subject to 
appropriate regulatory and supervisory arrangements. Influenced by international soft law 
norms, and framed in part by binding EU rules, the UK can today proudly boast a highly 
sophisticated and nuanced regulatory and supervisory regime governing RCHs. Yet while the 
UK’s regime applicable to CCPs has much to commend it, for the reasons provided above as 
to the inability of CCPs to mutualize loses associated with certain types of risk, much of this 
regulation is likely to be of limited value when things go seriously wrong. Moreover, to the 
extent that CCPs retain commercial discretion notwithstanding the constraints of the 
regulatory and supervisory regime to which they are subject, there is a very real risk that 
CCPs will pursue their own interests, and thus those of their members, in ways that do not 
necessarily help to promote public good—and, moreover, that they will do this when the 
public interest in maintaining the stability of the financial system is most vital. 
Finally, any move towards a more prominent role for CCPs in clearing repo 
agreements in particular, and SFTs more generally, is liable to shift the “too-big-to-fail” 
problem from one set of systemically important institutions (eg banks and broker dealers) to 
another (CCPs). Accordingly, contrary to efforts by the authorities in the aftermath of the 
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GFC to adopt policies which seek to end “too-big-to-fail”, and thus reduce moral hazard, 
increasing emphasis on the use of CCPs is in fact liable to do the opposite. While the use of 
recovery and resolution planning is undoubtedly prudent in such circumstances, it is argued 
that the experimental and uncertain nature of these measures makes them an unreliable, and 
certainly untested, backstop.  
Within a remarkably short space of time, CCPs have emerged from the shadows to 
occupy a central role in helping to neutralize incipient systemic risks in the post-GFC 
financial system. This article has offered a sceptical assessment of the burgeoning faith of 
policy-makers and regulators in the ability of CCPs to act as a means of containing contagion 
in repo markets. Given the weaknesses and dangers outlined and addressed above, the greater 
emphasis on CCPs to undertake extensive risk-management functions reveals the remarkably 
limited range of reform options which are currently available. Yet, while the need for viable 
solutions is undoubtedly acute, policy-makers and regulators must nevertheless face up to the 
fact that there is much about the workings of modern, global, complex, interconnected 
financial markets—especially when being tested under conditions of severe stress—that we 
simply do not yet know. It may be stretching it too far to suggest that misplaced faith in the 
ability of CCPs to deliver the type of resilience that such markets require amounts to yet more 
folly. But much like our misplaced faith in a newer brand of market-based finance, it is liable 
to represent yet another “false dawn”. 
